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Abstract 
The species of vitalism discussed here is a malleable construct, often with a poisonous 
reputation (but which I want to rehabilitate), hovering in the realms of the philosophy of 
biology, the history of medicine, and the scientific background of the Radical Enlightenment 
(case in point, the influence of vitalist medicine on Diderot). This is a more vital vitalism, or 
at least a more ‘biologistic’, ‘embodied’, medicalized vitalism. I distinguish between what I 
would call ‘substantival’ and ‘functional’ forms of vitalism, as applied to the eighteenth 
century. Substantival vitalism presupposes the existence of something like a (substantive) 
vital force which either plays a causal role in the natural world as studied by scientific means, 
or remains a kind of hovering, extra-causal entity. Functional vitalism tends to operate ‘post 
facto’, from the existence of living bodies to the desire to find explanatory models that will do 
justice to their uniquely ‘vital’ properties in a way that fully mechanistic models (one thinks 
e.g. of Cartesian mechanism) cannot. I discuss some representative figures of the Montpellier 
school as being functional rather than substantival vitalists, particularly as regards the models 
of organic organization which they develop, and make some suggestions as to how these 
relate to the then-nascent science of biology.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
There are different ways to approach the topic of vitalism today. It can be treated as a 
metaphysical theme, typically with reference to authors such as Henri Bergson and Georges 
Canguilhem (the latter also as a historian of medicine).
1
 Here, the vitalist is a thinker focusing 
on activity, dynamism, creative power, or perhaps the dialectic between health and sickness, 
including as a metaphorical way of conceiving of the social body as a whole. Or vitalism can 
be contextualized within a ‘historical epistemology’ of the life sciences, yielding historical 
distinctions between Montpellier vitalism (associated with prominent eighteenth-century 
doctors and professors at that faculty); a more embryology-based vitalism in Germany with 
Johann Friedrich Blumenbach and Hans Driesch in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
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centuries
2
, but also, the medically tinted doctrines of figures such as Diderot, whose obsession 
with ‘living matter’ or, at times, with the metaphysical thesis that all of matter was living 
matter, leads him to be understood in a context of affinity with medical vitalism.
3
 In the latter 
case, vitalism is the name for a theory that seeks to do justice to the specificity of certain types 
of entities in a more naturalistic context; these entities can be variously defined or polarized as 
living versus dead bodies, physiological versus anatomical objects of study, organisms versus 
machines, and so on. In addition, the word ‘vitalism’ is also used in various theory-oriented 
discourses in the humanities, in a markedly unclear and undefined manner.    
The situation is similarly tense in the disciplines seeking to articulate theoretical 
reflection on biology, including the philosophy of biology. Here, vitalism is typically 
understood as the view at the utmost margins of the development of modern biology, that life 
is somehow to be understood as possessing a mysterious ‘vital force’ or ‘vital principle’, apart 
from the causal, experimental world studied by natural science. In that sense the term 
‘vitalism’ is still badly in need of clarification and typological effort, given that writers close 
to the biological sciences use it to mean a kind of supernaturalism, while theorists in the 
humanities speak liberally of textual vitalism or the vitality of immateriality, while historians 
of the life sciences can quarrel over the differences between, e.g. medically or chemically 
based vitalisms, embryologically based variants and of course versions which fuse genres 
such as the ‘vital materialism’ of a Diderot. As we will see below, even approaches which are 
much more sympathetic to a ‘non-reductionist’ impulse in recent biological developments 
(with a focus on development, or evolutionary processes, or systemic concepts) still try and 
steer a safe path around the metaphysical dangers of vitalism. 
Faced with this attitude, the historian-‘épistémologue’ of the life sciences can simply 
retort that it is mistaken on the basis of precise historico-theoretical ‘facts’: that the context in 
which the word ‘vitalism’ was first used, in the later eighteenth century in the Faculty of 
Medicine at Montpellier, as a self-description referring to half a century’s worth of medico-
theoretical writings, shows none or hardly any signs of ‘vital force’ concepts.4 Similarly, with 
respect to the case of the influential German embryologist J.F. Blumenbach in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries: even his ‘vital force’ concept, the well-known 
Bildungstrieb is much closer to mechanism, and is understood as a Newtonian-type unknown 
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without ‘substantial’ existence of its own.5 Haller’s physiology of fibres is in the background: 
a sophisticated mechanism, but already one stressing irreducible ‘vital’ forces such as 
irritability. Blumenbach’s Bildungstrieb grows out of this context: not an a prioristic 
ontological vitalism but a sophisticated inductive model positing forces to explain observed 
phenomena.
6
 
A fully historicist approach to vitalism then produces a multitude of different forms – 
different epistemic norms, ontological commitments and scientific contexts: a vitalist 
invoking as her empirical evidence, the growth of the embryo, will produce quite a different 
theoretical claim than the vitalist who invokes the integrity of the ‘whole person’ in medicine, 
or the chemical properties of living matter versus ‘inert’ or ‘brute’ matter. But there remains a 
problem. If there is any overarching conceptual unity at all to the concept, what is vitalism 
calling for, if not for mysterious vital forces? That is, it may be a weak answer to simply say: 
there are many forms of vitalism and the ‘vital force’ form is just one of these. And further, is 
it possible in any sense to understand its posterity in the life sciences, given the successive 
attempts to eliminate it? For the hostility to a ‘mysterious’ vitalism is not just the invention of 
twentieth-century critics (whether motivated by genetics, or a generation earlier, by physics-
based arguments appealing to the causal closure of the physical world, in the Vienna Circle, 
with thinkers like Moritz Schlick
7
). It is present, one might say, constitutively, from at least 
the eighteenth century onwards. 
Physiologists, physicians and other figures in the orbit of what comes to be called 
‘biology’ in the same period fight a peculiar battle for disciplinary identity and especially 
legitimacy, in tension with what we might think of as a metaphysics of life, or a type of 
scientific practice supported by a metaphysics of life. Indeed, it is perhaps no coincidence that 
tensions surrounding ‘vitalism’ as an offending object to be removed, and efforts at 
conceptual clarification of the scope of a science called ‘biology’ seem to come hand in hand, 
from the later eighteenth century to the mid-nineteenth century, whether it is Albrecht von 
Haller attacking the excessively metaphysical concept of irritability in Francis Glisson, Xavier 
Bichat attacking the Montpellier vitalists for not having being sufficiently experimental, while 
he propounded his own ‘vitalist’ concept of the two lives, or Claude Bernard who applied to 
Bichat the ‘medicine’ he had given to his own predecessors, tarring him with the brush of 
vitalism. Bichat says that the Montpellier physicians “considered science philosophically; 
they would have made greater [scientific] progress if they had known more anatomy – Haller 
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only made such great progress for that reason.”8 Bichat’s doctrine of the ‘two lives’ was 
presented by Bernard as running counter to his own rigorous, ‘deterministic’ and monistic 
scheme: for Bernard, however much there may be features unique to the “living machine” 
(machine vivante), nevertheless, “the chemistry of the laboratory and the chemistry of life are 
subject to the same laws: there is no such thing as two (separate) chemistries.”9 (Yet Bernard 
ends up conceptualizing vital properties as well…) In that sense, vitalism is not just one 
theory among others that can be refuted or eliminated in the course of the history of the life 
sciences (like, say, preformationism). It is also a component in struggles for definition of an 
experimental life science that also involve demands for the autonomy of such a science.10 
Vitalism is then a concept, or better, a family of concepts – indeed, ones lacking a 
strictly conceptual presentation, as they are above all attempts to grasp the specificity of living 
systems, which then allow of more or less articulated conceptual reconstructions
11
 –  
implicated in a series of tensions and quarrels for legitimacy in the self-definition of the 
biomedical sciences. In addition, it seems to come in more or less metaphysical forms. We 
then need to achieve some conceptual clarity regarding this diversity, and to inquire into its 
metaphysical status. In what follows, I return (in sections 2 and 3) to what I see as the primary 
distinction between ‘forms of vitalism’, namely, substantival versus functional forms of 
vitalism, with particular focus on eighteenth-century Montpellier vitalism, and (in section 4) 
comparing this episode with Georg-Ernst Stahl and Hans Driesch, also as regards the models 
of organic organization on display. I conclude in section 5 with more general reflections on 
the posterity of vitalism in life science, and, again, the nature of organism or “animal 
economy” understood as a type of organization. 
 
2. Forms of vitalism 
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Vitalism has suffered from its nineteenth-century reinterpretations in terms of ‘vital 
forces’ and ‘entelechies’, notably at the hands of Hans Driesch. It continues to be presented as 
a very extreme, almost mystical view in current biological and philosophical discourse: in a 
recent review of theoretical biology, we are told that “in vitalism, living matter is 
ontologically greater than the sum of its parts because of some life force (“entelechy,” “élan 
vital,” “vis essentialis,” etc.) which is added to or infused into the chemical parts.”12 These 
authors are not denouncing vitalism in the name of genetic reductionism – indeed, they are 
seeking an anti-reductionist consensus in theoretical biology. However, ‘vitalism’ remains, in 
this context, the name for the unwelcome dinner guest. 
Yet when we consider the body of writings produced by the ‘Montpellier vitalists’, 
that is, the physicians associated with the Faculty of Medicine at the University of Montpellier 
in the second half of the eighteenth century,
13
 we find no traces of such metaphysically laden 
vital forces – or hardly any traces, for Paul-Joseph Barthez, the Dean of the School, flirts with 
the idea in the first edition of his Nouveaux éléments de la science de l’homme (1778; revised 
1806) but gives up it subsequently. (Barthez had initially asserted the existence of an 
independent vital force, but withdrew this and added a chapter to the second edition of his 
book entitled “Skeptical considerations on the nature of the vital principle.” He warned that 
one should follow an “invincible skepticism” (27; Notes, 98, n. 18) or a “reasonable 
Pyrrhonism” (226) when it comes to the vital principle. He only “personified” the vital 
principle, he explains, for ease of argument (107), for “one cannot have a priori knowledge of 
either Matter or Spirits” (83). In a wonderful phrase, he says: “I am as indifferent as could be 
regarding Ontology considered as the science of entities” (Nouveaux éléments, I, Notes, 96, n. 
17). And Bordeu, in his work on the history of medicine, has a similar tone complaining about 
the murky vitalism of his teachers: “We used to ask, lastly, what this vital principle was that 
was responsible for night and day (qui opère le blanc et le noir), and governed that which was 
opposed to it. Fizes gave us various definitions, all of them obscure, which told us nothing…” 
(Bordeu, Œuvres, II, 972). Here, the tone of the pragmatic physician – even one interested in 
the theorization of living entities – is patent, in its skepticism towards the unnecessary 
invocation of metaphysically defined concepts of life. What does it mean to investigate the 
nature of life skeptically? Contrary to what one might expect, it does not mean to approach 
vital phenomena with a demystifying, deflationary attitude, but rather, that Barthez only wants 
to attribute properties to the vital principle “that result immediately from experience” (ibid.). 
Hence we can interpret this ‘Enlightenment’ form of vitalism as functional rather than 
substantive (or substantival), as I have argued elsewhere: it is more of an attempt to ‘model’ 
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or ‘describe’ organic life without reducing it to fully mechanical models or processes, than an 
overt metaphysics of Life.
14
 
In other words, Enlightenment vitalism is different from vitalism as understood (or 
feared) by the mainstream philosopher of biology or biologist, because it is more of an 
attempt to model the organizational, systemic properties of organisms than a positing of 
animas or immaterial life-forces, the latter implying a form either of overt substance dualism 
(e.g. soul vs. body, in which the soul is the life principle) or at least an argument that 
differentiates between living and non-living, or organic and inorganic systems, on the basis of 
a substantial difference. The distinction is clear in the (negative) remark of the prominent 
systems theorist Ludwig von Bertalanffy, according to which  
Organisms exhibit the properties of life not because of some special peculiarity of 
these compounds, but on account of the heterogeneous system into which these 
compounds are articulated. There is no “living substance” because the characteristic of 
life is the organization of substances.
15
  
His “organizational” or relational definition of life would be a particular version of what I am 
calling ‘functional’ vitalism.  
But perhaps we should not be too quick to dismiss the metaphysical commitments of 
vitalism and happily proclaim that it is one form of a kind of heuristic organicism (perhaps 
even a more ‘modern’, friendlier vision of embodiment free from some of the aporias of the 
‘dialectic of Enlightenment’, as Elizabeth Williams suggests,16 and I will return to this 
complex loser-winner-loser-winner dialectic below in section 4). In other words, maybe it is 
impossible to have a viable concept of vitalism without also having some degree of a 
metaphysical commitment towards either the uniqueness of living beings within the physical 
universe, whether this specificity be hypostatized into an ontological fact (this is the classic 
version, that of Georg-Ernest Stahl and, differently, of Hans Driesch’s ‘neo-vitalism’) or 
whether it is left as something accessible to naturalistic explanation, as we shall see. Thus in 
the next two sections I discuss the pertinence of the distinction between substantival and 
functional forms of vitalism as it can be contextualized in the seventeenth-eighteenth 
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centuries (with reverberations through the nineteenth-century constitution of physiology as a 
partly non-reductionist science).
17
  
 
3. Substantival versus functional vitalism 
We are familiar with vitalism as a strong, ontological commitment to the existence of 
certain entities or ‘forces’, over and above the system of causal relations studied and modeled 
by mechanistic science, which itself seeks to express these entities or the relations between 
them in mathematical terms. This is a common view of the subject, whether it is presented in 
positive terms, as a kind of commendable backlash against the de-humanizing, alienating 
trend inaugurated by the Scientific Revolution
18, which seeks to ‘revitalize the world’ or in 
negative terms, as a kind of anti-scientific or ‘para-scientific’ trend which needs to be refuted 
(as in the influential assertion by the famous molecular biologist Jacques Monod, in his essay 
on ‘chance and necessity’ in modern biology, Le hasard et la nécessité), that the persistence 
of teleological concepts in biology reflects ignorance, nothing more). And there is plenty of 
historical evidence that such a position existed. 
But there is something wrong with this vision of things; not because we can adduce 
one counter-example but because the entire Montpellier school does not fit the description. 
And they are the ones for whom the term ‘vitalist’ was coined! After all, Barthez insisted in 
the “Discours préliminaire” added to the second edition of his work that he “never employed 
the term ‘Principe Vital’ to explain any vital phenomena,” but rather to enable the stable 
formation of “new results” out of these phenomena (Nouveaux éléments, 1806 edition, I, 
Notes, 4), and he assured the reader of his “invincible skepticism” with regard to the Vital 
Principle (27).
19
 
Following the fundamental work of Roselyne Rey, François Duchesneau and 
Elizabeth Williams, who have done much to put it on the map, I have argued elsewhere that 
the Montpellier vitalist school expresses a ‘structural-functional’ form of vitalism, with the 
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celebrated image of the bee-swarm (found in Maupertuis, Bordeu, Diderot
20
 and also Ménuret 
de Chambaud’s Encyclopédie article cited below) expressing the structural relation between 
one life and many lives. The structural-functional understanding of living systems, again, does 
not appeal to a special ‘substance’ to define them, but rather to what von Bertalanffy would 
have called an “organizational” understanding. In his fascinating and quite programmatic 
article in the Encyclopédie on the notion of ‘animal economy’, Ménuret defines the latter term 
as “l’ordre, le méchanisme, l’ensemble des fonctions & des mouvemens qui entretiennent la 
vie des animaux.”21 This is neither a strictly anatomical perspective on organisms, nor one 
appealing to an immaterial vital principle, including the soul. Rather, the vitalist interest here 
is on the type of articulation of the parts in an organism: both the specificity of the relation 
between the parts, and indeed the specificity of the material properties of these parts (i.e. the 
organs) themselves. 
The animal economy in this context is very much a proto-organism concept (the term 
‘organism’, although it had been used in the early 1700s in the debate between Leibniz and 
Stahl, does not appear in a stabilized form designating living organization before the late 
eighteenth century; authors such as Charles Bonnet or Immanuel Kant speak rather of 
‘organized bodies’22). Its fundamentally structural, functional, but also relational property 
appears in what was probably the most famous metaphor used to describe it, the bee-swarm. 
(And its status as metaphor, not as a literal designation of a particular type of entity, is 
important in Bordeu’s discussion, where he is quite self-conscious about the need to approach 
the question of what makes a living system, living, through metaphors, as I emphasize below.) 
Here is Bordeu’s version of the bee-swarm metaphor, in his masterpiece, the Recherches 
anatomiques sur la position et la fonction des glandes (1751), in a section entitled How to 
understand the action of all the parts, their departments, and their periodic motions:  
… there is a general circulation, and many particular circulations, which are, if I may 
speak thus, like small circles which gradually form a larger one. 
Hence the least part should be considered as ‘a body apart’, so to speak. True, it acts by 
means of the general circulation, but it is as distinct as the system of blood vessels is distinct 
from the chiliac vessel system, or as the circulation of the lung and the liver are from what 
occurs in ordinary large vessels. 
Might I make use of a comparison which, however rough, may be useful? 
I compare the living body, in order to properly assess the particular action of each part, to 
a swarm of bees which cluster together, and hang from a tree like a bunch of grapes; I find 
the image suggested by an ancient author, that one of the lower organs was an animal in 
animali, to be quite helpful. Each part is, so to speak, not quite an animal, but a kind of 
independent machine which contributes in its way to the general life of the body. 
Hence, following the comparison to a bee-swarm, it is a whole stuck to a tree branch, by 
means of the action of many bees which must act in concert to hold on; some others become 
                                                          
20
 See for some details Colas Duflo, “Diderot et Ménuret de Chambaud.” 
21
 Ménuret, “Œconomie Animale,” 362a. 
22
 See Tobias Cheung, “From the organism of a body to the body of an organism,” and Charles T. Wolfe, “The 
organism as ontological go-between,” and on the animal economy as an organism concept, Wolfe and Terada, 
“Animal Economy.” 
9 
attached to the initial ones, and so on; all concur in forming a fairly solid body, yet each one 
has a particular action, apart from the others; if one of them gives way or acts too 
vigorously, the entire mass will be disturbed: when they all conspire to stick close, to 
mutually embrace, in the order of required proportions, they will comprise a whole which 
shall endure until they disturb one another.
23
 
The language of ‘concurrence’, interaction, cohesion or consensus of the parts is also attributed in 
this text to the Hippocratic tradition (with intimations of the Hippocratic image of the ‘circle’ of 
life). And Ménuret goes on to explain how a stable interaction between parts (“lives,” i.e. individual 
organs) is what constitutes health. In his article on “Observation” in the Encyclopédie, Ménuret 
mentions the bee-swarm and Bordeu in order to emphasize that life in the body occurs, or is best 
described as, a “connection of actions” (“liaison d’actions”):  
One could, following these authors, compare man to a flock of cranes which fly together, 
in a particular order, without mutually assisting or depending on one another. The 
Physicians or Philosophers who have studied and carefully observed man, have noticed 
this sympathy in all animal movements – this constant and necessary agreement in the 
interaction of the various parts, however disparate or distant from one another; they have 
also noticed the disturbance of the whole that results from the sensory disagreement of a 
single part. A famous physician (M. de Bordeu) and an illustrious physicist (M. de 
Maupertuis) likewise compared man, from this luminous and philosophical point of view, 
to a swarm of bees which strive together to hang to a tree branch. One can see them 
pressing and sustaining one another, forming a kind of whole (une espèce de tout), in 
which each living part contributes in its way, by the correspondence and direction of its 
movements, to sustain this kind of life of the whole body, if we may refer in this way to a 
mere connection of actions (liaison d’actions).24 
What the ‘vitalist’ Ménuret is doing here with the bee-swarm metaphor for the animal 
economy (or ‘organism’ in our vocabulary, as I have argued elsewhere, pointing to the 
numerous cases in which the animal economy, when it is taken as an object of study, not as a 
field of research, is presented as a more sophisticated type of arrangement of and relation 
between the parts than mere mechanisms) is asserting a structural, relational, positional 
approach to what makes living bodies unique. 
Many commentaries on the image of the bee-swarm relate it to its more popular usage 
as a metaphor for social, economic or political order in works such as Mandeville’s Fable of 
the Bees.
25
 But there is no innate socio-political ‘moral’ to be derived from the vitalist usage 
of the bee-swarm metaphor for organismic unity. Granted, nineteenth-century ‘biologizations 
of the social’ and their early twentieth-century fascistic outcomes tended to privilege a 
purportedly natural and authentic (‘holistic’) metastability over and against individual desires, 
appetites and values. But the vitalist emphasis here is that the individual bees (organs) in the 
bee-swarm (organism) should be understood as individual lives, rather than as passive 
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 Bordeu, Recherches anatomiques, § CXXV, in Bordeu, Œuvres, vol. 1, 187. 
24
 Ménuret, “Observation,” 318b-319a. 
25
 For some comparative study of biological and social usages of the bee-swarm metaphor see Schlanger, 
Métaphores de l’organisme and Sheehan and Wahrman, Invisible Hands. 
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components of a mechanism. And the metaphor of the machine has its own dubious socio-
political posterity. 
Suffice it to say that such derivations from the Enlightenment texts are neither obvious 
nor very enriching as regards the understanding of the concepts at work here (nineteenth-
century reinterpretations of these ideas within the Montpellier School, such as Jacques 
Lordat’s, did in contrast seek to turn them into hardened monarchist positions…26). Bordeu, 
Ménuret or Fouquet would have been bewildered by an anti-’organismic’ assertion such as 
this: “We are not organisms, but persons. The nexus of relations which unites us in a human 
society is not organic but personal.”27 One can also overplay the revolutionary dimension of 
the bee-swarm metaphor, as in Peter Hanns Reill’s judgment that “Enlightenment vitalism 
was not politically conservative, though some of its proponents may have been. Rather, it 
employed the images of consent and cooperation; it spoke of the assembly of forces and their 
free play; its image of organization excluded a single directing power or ‘royal’ force. As 
such it often contained liberal and sometimes revolutionary overtones.”28 
So I return to my primary interest: what model of order, what model of organization 
does the vitalist discussion of the animal economy, metaphorized as the bee-swarm, yield? In 
fact, it is not univocal. 
For instance, one should note the presence of (partly) mechanistic language in Ménuret’s 
descriptions (more than in Bordeu’s for instance), with the language of ‘springs’ (ressorts). This 
implies that even if we are faced with a form of holism here (as the idea of a ‘Life’ composed of 
smaller ‘lives’ makes explicit), it is a holism where componential analysis, that is, analysis of the 
properties of the parts, still plays a role. In that sense, not only is the form of vitalism expressed in 
the above passages far removed from claims about mysterious vital forces; this structural-functional 
approach to life is also closer to materialism than is often said, if we notice the appeal to a kind of 
vital materiality. As Diderot put it, playing on the most classic mechanist analogy: “What a 
difference there is, between a sensing, living watch and a golden, iron, silver or copper 
watch!”29 The difference is of course one of the particular material realization of ‘watch’, that is, a 
flesh-and-blood arrangement of parts versus a strictly mechanical arrangement of parts – and also a 
difference in organization, since Diderot emphasizes that the organic continuity of the flesh has 
systemic differences with the strictly spatial ‘continuity’ of non-living matter due to the presence of 
the nervous system in the former. 
If the model of organic organization (or “animal economy”) on display here, conveyed 
through the image of the bee-swarm, is an organism concept, it should be stressed that it is a 
structural and relational concept of organism rather than a more ‘Romantic’ concept which opposes 
living organization to that of a machine or matter in general in terms of a ‘centre’, an ‘inside’, a 
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 See Lavabre-Bertrand, La philosophie médicale de l’école de Montpellier. 
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 John Macmurray, Persons in Relation, 46. 
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 Reill, Vitalizing Nature in the Enlightenment, 12. 
29
 Diderot, Éléments de physiologie, in Diderot, Œuvres complètes, XVII, 335. On the interplay between vitalism 
and materialism in the Montpellier context see Wolfe and Terada, “The Animal Economy,” and, particularly on 
Diderot, Kaitaro, Diderot’s Holism. 
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kind of self. As Denise Leduc-Fayette put it, “from organization to organism, there is only one step 
to be taken, which Romantic philosophy will take.”30  These two models of organization are, 
indeed, two forms of vitalism, one substantival (and ultimately “Romantic,” as it were) and one 
functional, appealing to particular structural arrangements. The functional vitalist could declare, 
like von Bertalanffy cited above, that “Organisms exhibit the properties of life not because of some 
special peculiarity of these compounds, but on account of the heterogeneous system into which 
these compounds are articulated. There is no “living substance” because the characteristic of life is 
the organization of substances” (Modern theories of development, 48). 
One might object that there is a tension between the structural, relational emphasis on the 
bee-swarm as a particular type of arrangement or organization, and the materialist emphasis – 
whether vital or not – on a particular type of matter. But in fact, both conceptual figures seep into 
one another, and both oscillate or waver in terms of one another: sometimes Diderot will seek to 
define the properties of this “sensing, living” matter in organizational terms, and similarly, 
sometimes the animal economy is presented in more or less materialist terms, including when 
Bordeu, Fouquet and Ménuret reproach Stahl for not providing a sufficient material account of the 
processes he attributes to the anima. In addition, it is perhaps not a negligible terminological fact 
that when the Montpellier authors first spoke of ‘vitalism’ and ‘vitalists’, they observed that the 
term was synonymous with ‘sensibilist’. Thus, when reflecting on the vitalist movement in the first 
years of the nineteenth century, the physician Henri Fouquet simply stated that the terms amount to 
the same thing – “the doctrine of sensibility is the same as that of vitalism” – since “whatever is 
sensitive is vital.”31 Sensibility or sensitivity was of course a key feature of organic life, 
experimentally defined by Albrecht von Haller in his celebrated experiments, that materialists such 
as Diderot transposed into a property of living matter itself. Vital materiality also implies a concern 
with individuality, with the individual as a specific organizational cluster: as Diderot writes, “this 
swarm is an entity, an individual.”32 
Contrasting with the rather blunt, ahistorical warnings of a Monod, but also with the 
more nuanced concerns of Gilbert and Sarkar (for whom, recall, ‘vitalism’ meant an appeal to vital 
forces, principles or entelechies, while ‘organicism’ was a non-metaphysically based project to 
understand the specificities of vital organization, akin to what I have called structural-functional, or 
relational vitalism), we have seen that Montpellier vitalism in its predominant varieties was more of 
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 Denise Leduc-Fayette, “La Mettrie et Descartes,” 45. In his Vitalizing Nature in the Enlightenment Peter Hans 
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 Fouquet, Discours sur la clinique, 78. 
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 Diderot, Rêve de D’Alembert, in Diderot, Œuvres complètes, XVII, 120. 
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an organizationally motivated explanatory project, and also materialism-friendly (particularly in 
Ménuret and Fouquet, and in Bordeu to a lesser degree). But if the Montpellier vitalists were not 
‘cranks’ or freaks, who did believe in an immaterialist, supernaturalist form of vitalism? That is, 
ontological rather than explanatory teleology; immaterial forces playing a causal role in a material 
world; a metaphysically grounded concept of Life? A prime candidate would be Georg-Ernest 
Stahl, a court physician to Duke Johann Ernst of Saxon-Weimar and subsequently, as of 1694, a 
Professor of Medicine at the University of Halle and author of various works on chemistry, 
medicine and the difference between mechanism and organism. Stahl describes the body and its 
organs as literally mere instruments of the soul; even when he seems to step back from this position 
in its literal form, reflecting that “organs are not, as the name might suggest, mere instruments,” he 
adds that nevertheless, “it is the soul that makes the lungs breathe, the heart beat, the blood 
circulate, the stomach digest, the liver secrete”33: this is a strong teleology. And throughout the 
collection of essays entitled Theoria medica vera, he asks about ‘what we call Life’, ‘what purpose 
does it serve’, within and outside the body? Indeed, in his teleology, his animism and his insistence 
on an ontology of Life which would be more foundational than specific enquiries such as in 
chemistry or medicine, Stahl seems the canonical version of a substantival vitalist.  
 
4. Losers and winners? Stahl, Driesch and the Montpellier critique  
There was indeed a more animism-friendly side of the spectrum of Montpellier vitalism, 
represented by François Boissier de Sauvages, who added a Stahlian component, the soul as central 
explanatory principle in organic processes of self-maintenance
34
, although he also defended the 
pertinence of mechanical and mathematical explanations in medicine (referring notably to Newton). 
Yet the Montpellier vitalists predominantly reject the ‘substantival vitalism’ in Stahlian animism; 
its ontology, indeed the very fact that it has an ontological component. Granted, they are also anti-
mechanistic, as can be seen e.g. in Bordeu’s reflections on the history of medicine: “Spare us, once 
and for all, all these tiny fibres, pressures, globules, thick substances, sharp angles, lymph, 
hammers and all the rest of the equipment from mechanical workshops with which [earlier doctors] 
filled the living body – they were the playthings of our fathers” (Bordeu, Œuvres, II, 670). But 
despite their criticism of mechanistic models for Life – for their inertness, for their inapplicability 
to living beings, and so forth – the Montpellier vitalists are quite dismissive of this Stahlian 
intrusion of a non-medical entity (the soul) into medical explanations. Here is Ménuret:  
Who wouldn’t laugh at an animist or Stahlian who would argue that this illness is a gift 
of Nature or the soul, a kind and farsighted mother who directs all efforts to heal the 
illness, and even exacerbates them on the pretext of necessity, hoping for benefits that 
one hopelessly expects from elsewhere? (“Ténesme,” Enc. XVI, 137a). 
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 Stahl, Disquisitio de mecanismi et organismi diversitate, § XCVIII, in Stahl, Œuvres médico-philosophiques 
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But on the other hand the status of chemistry is not univocal. Stahl deserves credit for 
insisting on the unique chemical composition of life (or, put more philosophically, the fact that 
claims for the ontological specificity of life can be bolstered by chemical analyses). He emphasizes 
the importance of chemistry for conceptualizing what is unique in organic beings (their 
characteristic mixtio rather than mere aggregates) but, somewhat dialectically, he adds that once 
that reaches the level of a theoria medica vera, then one can dispense with the chemical analysis of 
bodies, like the ladder we leave behind after having climbed up it (not his image!), e.g. in the 1706 
Paraenesis ad aliena a medica doctrina arcendum.  
This link between Stahlian chemistry and vitalism is patent in the figure of Gabriel-
François Venel, the French Stahlian chemist who was close to the doctors of the Montpellier 
medical school, and also authored the important article “Chymie” in the Encyclopédie.35 Here, 
chemistry has as its main goal to understand the specificity of life. François Pépin suggests that 
“chemistry and vitalism” worked together “in an open, mutually beneficial and non-hierarchical 
relationship.”36 Yet what are the respective ontological commitments of vitalism and chemistry? If 
one contrasts figures such as Stahl (on the one hand) and Venel (on the other hand), with Bordeu 
somewhere in between, a whole gradation of views emerges on whether chemistry helps justify the 
specificity of living beings, or whether a science of living beings has to defend itself against the 
(reductionist?) encroachment of chemistry. Venel seems to hold the former view, Stahl the latter, 
and Bordeu worries about both extremes. But Bordeu’s way of occupying an ontological middle 
ground is also related to his practice of metaphor, which I have mentioned above, but shall seek to 
clarify now. 
In his Recherches anatomiques sur la position et la fonction des glandes, when 
discussing the problem of whether the secretory process of the glands can be reduced to a type of 
sensation or not, Bordeu critiques Stahl’s notion of anima but without making a frontal empirical 
disagreement (thus unlike Ménuret as quoted above). Bordeu emphasizes that both this idea of 
sensation and Stahl’s anima are metaphors:  
 This is again one of these metaphors which must be allowed us ; . . . It is difficult . . . to explain 
oneself, when it comes to speaking of the force which so carefully directs a thousand singular 
motions in the human body and its parts; what terms should we use to describe them? . . . We 
will discuss Stahl’s hypothesis elsewhere: he claimed that the soul directed everything in the 
animal body. Whatever the case may be, we can state that all living parts are directed by an ever-
vigilant force conservatrice; does this force belong, in certain respects, to the essence of a part of 
matter, or is it a necessary attribute of its combinations? . . . We can only suggest a way of 
conceiving things, metaphorical expressions, comparisons...
37
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To say that the Stahlian concept of soul is a metaphor (which Stahl does not say!) is essentially to 
say that the concept has functional value (or not) depending on how well it models phenomena – 
rather than making a claim about what sorts of things exist. The vitalists neither countenance the 
irrationalism – or better, supernaturalism – of Stahl’s anima, nor, of course, are they mechanists. 
Yet their vision of ‘animal economy ‘ – of organism – is predominantly a structural-functional one, 
in contrast to Stahl’s more substantival vitalism. 
The Stahlian belief in ‘anima’ is quite similar qua form of vitalism, to the position of the 
embryologist Hans Driesch in the late nineteenth century. Driesch comes out of the school of 
Wilhelm Roux’s Entwicklungsmechanik or study of the mechanisms of the developmental process, 
and (in)famously moved from experimentation with sea urchin eggs, discovering feature of 
"totipotency," to the metaphysical theory of entelechies existing in all living organisms. Faced with 
the evidence that there was no physical structure we can find in the sea urchin embryo which is 
responsible for the "regulative" or "equipotential" force, he felt obliged to posit a non-spatial vital 
force, the entelechy.  
A careful consideration of authors such as Bordeu, Fouquet, Ménuret and Barthez (at 
least starting with the second edition of his Nouveaux éléments, where he makes some effort to 
eliminate the language of ‘vital force’ and ‘vital principle’, or at least express skepticism towards 
such entities as ‘personified’) would show that it is possible to have a non-reductionist approach to 
biological organization, including in some cases a kind of ‘expanded mechanist’ approach, without 
it amounting to a substantival vitalism of either the Stahlian or the Drieschian sort. That is, in the 
(perhaps deliberately provocative) terms of Georges Canguilhem, “Eighteenth-century vitalists are . 
. . not impenitent metaphysicians but rather prudent positivists, which is to say, in that period, 
Newtonians.”38 Of course, this raises more questions than it answers. For instance, which entities 
are legitimate bases for vitalism? The Montpellier vitalists, given their medical focus, are primarily 
anthropocentric but could extend their analysis to animals; Driesch builds a kind of metaphysics of 
the sea urchin; Stahl’s animism is also a ‘chimio-vitalism’, a doctrine of vital chemistry. 
5. Conclusion 
Vitalism ‘rotates’ here through more substantival (foundational and at times dualist) and 
more functional (organizational, animal-economic) forms. Only in the first form is it a doctrine in 
which “living matter is ontologically greater than the sum of its parts because of some life force 
(“entelechy,” “élan vital,” “vis essentialis,” etc.) which is added to or infused into the chemical 
parts” (to reiterate Gilbert and Sarkar’s definition), although it should be acknowledged that to 
presume the existence of something is not directly tantamount to a metaphysical position: precisely, 
vital force talk in Blumenbach or Bordeu is deliberately ‘ontologically empty’. As a particular case 
of the second form, I discussed a reconstructed version of the doctrine of the Montpellier School. 
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Here, no metaphysical postulates of immaterial entities or forces, like Driesch’s entelechies, are 
found. It is a more practical, heuristically oriented medical and philosophical program that uses 
functional, Newtonian-inspired models of organism to discuss temporal, dynamic and sometimes 
subjective dimensions of embodiment – disease, crisis, pulse, nosology … In addition to these two 
forms of vitalism – substantival (Stahl, Driesch) and functional (the Montpellier School), which 
articulate different models of living organization (as regards issues such as unity, structure, and 
interrelation) in the twentieth century, thinkers such as Kurt Goldstein and Georges Canguilhem 
developed a more existentially defined vitalism, understood as an attitude living beings necessarily 
adopt towards other such beings.
39
 Eighteenth-century discussions of biological organization do 
not, in contrast, seem especially concerned with the question of the ‘observer’, although Kantians 
might wish to differ. Vitalism thus comes in different forms, some of which seem well beyond the 
pale for mainstream biological thought, while others can serve as useful heuristics or correctives in 
attempting to deal with the question of the ontological status of living entities. As regards its 
posterity in the life sciences, I shall make two final remarks.  
First, as regards the status of vitalism in the history of science. The perpetually 
reinvented polemical dimension of vitalism – in which a thinker seeking to articulate a claim for the 
autonomy of biological entities can accuse his predecessor of having been the real vitalist, whereas 
the ‘legitimate’ life scientist is simply an experimentalist – seems to belong to the problems of the 
conceptualization of the biomedical fields as a whole. (That the words ‘vitalism’ and ‘biology’ are 
coined at about the same time, as I mentioned earlier, is the sign of something worth investigating.) 
In the present case, this includes the very broad question ‘does vitalism impact the history of 
science?’ and the slightly more specific ‘does vitalism lead to a science such as biology?’ In either 
of these two cases, we are faced with the possible ‘legitimization’ or ‘normalization’ of what was 
thought to be a marginal or scientifically superfluous movement, by seeking to inscribe it in a 
narrative of the development of biological science. The possibility of such an inscription allows of 
both a stronger and a weaker interpretation. The stronger case for vitalism is the sort made by 
partisans of, e.g. theoretical biology whose anti-reductionism is very zealous – a kind of non-
negotiable commitment.
40
 The weaker case is easier to defend, because it is less directly falsifiable. 
It includes the more functional form of vitalism, which is also harder to present in ‘refutable’ terms. 
In a sense, the mirror image of the stronger case for vitalism is the classic reductionist position, for 
which vitalism sensu Stahl or Driesch is to be consigned to the rubbish heap of history (that is, 
science). On the one hand, for the historical epistemologist these are all different constellations to 
be studied without normative bias. On the other hand, for the more conceptual approach I have 
sketched out here, not all approaches are equal, but I leave that open to discussion. 
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Further, the mainstream reductionist position according to which the science of life needs 
to dispense with foundational or otherwise essentialist inquiries into the nature of Life itself (not to 
mention biological projects motivated by a metaphysics of Life) can also take the form of the more 
Stoic ‘constat’ of a great biologist like François Jacob, that we no longer ‘inquire into Life’41, i.e., 
that the concept of Life, and by extension any ontologically foundational clauses attached to work 
in the life sciences, no longer serves any purpose in such work. Now, the historical epistemologist 
could take inspiration from Jacob’s verdict on modern biology and suggest that the crystallization 
of biology as a discipline, both in terms of terminological stabilization and of ‘practice’ understood 
as contributing to an organized discipline, may not have required a strong concept of Life 
(including in the sense of an ontology of Life), even though vitalist ideas may have played more of 
a role in such a crystallization than is often thought.
42
 Perhaps disappointingly to the strong vitalist, 
and frustratingly to the ‘deflationist’, in none of the cases discussed here, including Stahl and the 
Montpellier vitalists, does it appear to be straightforwardly the case that a vitalist ‘theory’ or 
‘claim’ or ‘metaphor’ gets naturalized or formalized or quantified and turned into mainstream 
science – with the exceptions of Blumenbach et al. (in embryology rather than medicine). However, 
there is a distinctive ‘form of life’ that emerges in the reflections of the Montpellier School and the 
various related projects, whether antecedent (Glisson, Stahl), contemporary and congenial 
(Diderot), contemporary and competitive (Haller), or posterior (Cabanis, Bichat, Bernard). 
My second concluding remark concerns the nature of vital organization as understood in 
the vitalist corpus I have discussed. Notably, the understanding of organic individuality in the 
vitalist authors surveyed above does not treat such individuality (a.k.a. specific modes of 
organization) as a thing but as a ‘system’, a dynamic relation between individual vital centres (the 
little ‘lives’) which are interrelated by means of ‘sympathy’, ‘consensus’, ‘conspiration’ etc., that is, 
various forms of reciprocity, in a “circle of action.”43 (‘Sympathy’ is used here in a strictly 
naturalistic sense, befitting its later usage as in the ‘sympathetic nervous system.) What Bordeu’s 
insistence on the metaphorical character of the bee-swarm also tells us is that such a system has no 
a priori existence, as it is the outcome of particular interactions. But this relational character of the 
bee-swarm means it is not just an empty metaphor, although it is also not restrictive: the model of 
organic organization as something constituted by the relations between these little “lives,” like in a 
bee-swarm, can nevertheless be interpreted structurally in different senses, depending on the extent 
to which ‘structure’ is ontologized: 
— as a kind of “structure of structures,” in which each part of a living being is a structure, or 
better, each arrangement of these parts is a structure. But this runs of the risk of collapsing 
organic organization back into mechanism, since it is primarily if not exclusively a spatial 
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understanding; conversely, this structural presentation can also reduce the organism to a kind 
of pure mind or self, including in the weaker form of an inner teleology, an inner sense which 
governs the destiny of the body, which the Montpellier vitalists never do (the situation is 
different in so-called ‘neo-vitalism’ a century later). 
— Conversely, the type of organic unity that we can see being intimated, sketched out and 
sometimes metaphorized in the Montpellier texts, can be understood as structural and 
relational, as I have discussed above. An added feature here would be that, since this 
organization is necessarily the product of interaction between material components, it is 
“emergent.” That, despite some of the criticisms of early modern mechanism we encountered 
in these authors (e.g. Bordeu), this picture of organization seems mechanist-friendly should 
not be so surprising, given that the animal economy here cannot be conceptualized otherwise 
than as an analysis of the components of the body (even if, to be sure, the interaction between 
these components, e.g. in the case of glandular secretions, leads to the modelling of functional 
properties far different from anything on display in Descartes, Borelli or Boerhaave). In 
Ménuret’s words: 
everything leads us to believe that the human body is like the other machines 
which art can assemble, disassemble, and witness in their tiniest springs; it is a 
fact known to any artist, that in even the most complex machines, the entire 
movement rests and bears on one particular piece from which the movement 
began, and from which it spreads to the rest of the machine, producing various 
particular effects in each particular spring. It is only by discovering such a 
spring in man that we can come to properly know and determine the manner of 
acting of the general causes of life, health, sickness and death.
44
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